

LIST OF CARTER REAGAN TRANSITION OFFICERS

<u>AGENCY</u>	<u>CARTER T.O.</u>	<u>PHONE #</u>	<u>REAGAN T.O.</u>	<u>PHONE #</u>
Agriculture	Jim Williams Howard Hjort Joan Wallace	447-6158	Richard Lyng	634-1680 (HQ) 426-5260
Commerce	Elsa Porter	337-4951	Calvin Collier	
Defense	Peter Hamilton	697-8388	Wm. Van Cleave	634-4900
Education	Steven A. Minter	755-1100	Loreli Kinder	634-1783
Energy	Douglas Robinson	252-6476	Michael Halbouty (713) 622-1130	634-1680
EHS	Randy Kinder Alair Townsend	245-7163 245-6396	Robert Carleson	245-0491 245-7748
HUD	Terrance Duvernay	755-6810	Gerald Carmen	634-1783
Interior	William Kendig	343-4701	Richard Richards	634-1662
Justice	Kevin Rooney	633-3101	Richard Wiley	
LABOR	Paul Jensen	523-8231	Richard Shubert	
State	Peter Tarnoff	632-2540	Robert Neumann	634-4900
Transpt.	Bill Beckham	426-2222	Arthur Teele	634-1616
Treasury	Curt Hessler	566-2551	Gerald Parsky	
ACTION	Robt. Currie	254-7264	John Burgess	634-1783
ACUS	Stephen Babcock	254-7020	Rbt. D'Agostino	
Ad.C.Hist.P.	Rbt. R. Garvey, Jr.	254-3967	Sheila Wiedenfeld	
ACIR	Wayne Anderson	653-5540	Freida Poundstone	
AID	Doug Clark	632-1800		
Alaska N Gas	Peter Cook	275-1100		
AppalachianRC	Page Ingraham	673-7869	Alex Armendaris	
ArmsControl	Norman Clyne	632-9580	James Malone	
DisarmAgency				

LIST OF CARTER/REAGAN TRANSITION OFFICERS ()

<u>AGENCY</u>	<u>CARTER T.O.</u>	<u>PHONE #</u>	<u>REAGAN T.O.</u>	<u>PHONE #</u>
Bd.Int.Broad.			Jack Shakespeare	
CAB	Mary McInnis David Kirstein	673-5164	Wayne Bishop	463-2400
CIA	Richard Lehman	351-6724	Robert Mittendorf	
CivilRightsC	Louis Nounes	254-8130	Julie LaFontante	
CommodityFut.	Don Tendick	254-7556		
Corp.PublicBr.	Fred Wacker	293-3182	Fran Griffin	
CSA	Lee Foley	254-5590	Constance Newman	634-1783
ConsumerPSC	Lowell Dodge	634-7700	Barbara Keating-Edh	
HPA	Jack Ford	755-2705	Norman Livermore	634-1662
EEOC	Preston David	634-6814	James A. Parker	
Ex-Im Bank	Warren Glick	566-8334	William W. Gimer	857-0600
Farm Credit A	Paul C. Redmer	755-4394		
FCC	Frank Lloyd	632-6600	Michael Gardner	
FDIC	Alan Miller Mike Hovan	389-4203		
PEC	Allen Clutter William Loughery	523-4093	Robert Visser	
FEMA	Bill Jones	653-7776	Robert Kupperman	
Fed. Home Loan BB	Rita Fair	377-6273		
Fed.Maritime	Arthur Pankhof	523-5800	Donald Ivers	
FERC	Walter Schroeder	357-8191	Danny Boggs	331-8700
Fed.Lb.Rel.A.	Eugene Orza	254-9266		
Foreign Claims			Brain O'Doherty	

AGENCY	CARTER T.O.	PHONE	DEAGAN T.O.
FTC	Chris White	523-2700	James C. Miller III
GSA	E. Perley Eaton	566-1212	Harvey Capnick
ICA	Richard Cohen	724-9186	Alan Weinstein
ICC	Jim Voytko	275-1912	Fred Andre
IDCA	Jonathan Marks	632-1754	
Int. Trade Commission	Charles Ervin	523-4463	Michael Samuels
Legal Services Corp.	Dan Bradley Mary Bourdette	272-4020	William J. Olson
MSPB	Richard Redenius	653-6943	Tim McNamara Tom Devine
NASA	Gerald Griffin	755-3972	George Low
NLRB	Eugene Orza	254-8047	
NRC	William Dierks	492-7511	Richard Kennedy 634-12
NSF	Tom Ubois	357-7748	Dr. James Fletcher
Nat'l. Credit UA	Rosemary Brady		
Nat'l. End Arts	Don Moore	634-6076	Robert S. Carter
Nat'l. End Hum	Thomas Litzenburg	724-0347	Richard Bishirian
Nat'l. Tran Saf	Lars Peterson	472-6016	Mary Zuniga, Jr. 634-12
Occ. Safety Health Rev.	Robert Combar Larry Boss	634-6622	
Off. Consumer Aff.	Ed Cohen	456-6226	
OPM	Margery Waxman	632-4632	Ronald Devine
Peace Corps.	Mark G. Este	254-7970	

AGENCY	CARTER T.O.	PHONE #	REAGAN T.O.	PHONE #
PostalRateC	R. Legon/David Harris	254-88	John Lathrop Ryan	
Postal Serv.	C. Neil Benson	245-5225	John Lathrop Ryan	
SFC	Daniel Goelzer	272-2181	Roger Spencer	
Selective Serv.	Bernard Rotsker	724-0837		
SBA	Bill Mauk	653-6678	W. Hugel	
Smithsonian	John Jameson	357-3080		
Syn Fuels	Jerry Pfeffer	653-4410	Noble	(918) 494-3062
JSRA	William Bozman	426-1924		
U.S. Reg. Council	Peter Petkas	395-6110		
VA	Rufus Wilson	389-2817	William Ayres	

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CIA TRANSITION TEAM

CIA
Office

CIA
Room

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Home

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Team Leader

William Middendorf

Deputy Team Leader

LTG Edward L. Rowny, USA

Secretaries

[Redacted]

Executive Assistant

[Redacted]

Assistants to Team Leader and Deputy

John Bross

George Carver

[Redacted]

Walter Pforzheimer

[Redacted]

Senior Advisors

William J. Casey

Ray Cline

Vernon Walters

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
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Consultants

Roland Herbst

Rob Silverstein

Ken Adleman



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NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER


WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

NFAC 7997-80
10 December 1980

NOTE FOR: SA/DIC1

Vince,

You asked for a list for the Transition Team of international conferences which NFAC employees will be attending during the next 90 days. Here it is. Per our telephone conversation yesterday evening, we have emphasized the major conferences in gathering this information. Sorry for the delay in responding.



EA/DD/NFAC


Attachment:
as stated

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NFAC 7971-80

8 December 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
General Counsel
Legislative Counsel
Inspector General
Comptroller
Director of Public Affairs
Director of Personnel Policy, Planning, and Management
Director of Equal Employment Opportunity

FROM : 
Special Assistant to the Deputy Director

SUBJECT : Transition Team Request

Note the attached request from the Transition Team concerning a list of meetings or conferences that are international in scope in which CIA employees will be participating during the next 90 days. Please provide this information for your areas by close of business Tuesday, 9 December. Telephone calls will be sufficient (call ).



Attachment:
Transition Team Memo

STAT
STAT

5 December 1980

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
Special Assistant to the DDCI

FROM: Edward L. Rowny
CIA/PTT

SUBJECT: Request for Information

I would appreciate your providing the Transition Team with the following information:

1. Names of the members of Team B. *Done - UP*
2. A list of meetings or conferences that are international in scope in which CIA employees will be participating during the next 90 days.

[REDACTED]
Edward L. Rowny

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TRANSITION OFFICERS

WHITE HOUSE

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Jack Watson
White House Chief of Staff 456-6798

Al McDonald
White House Staff Director 456-7873

Harrison Wellford
OMB Executive Director 395-3864

Michael Rowny
Deputy to the Staff Director 456-7873

White House Administrative Contact:

Hugh Carter
Special Assistant to the President
for Administration 456-2702

White House Press Contacts:

Ray Jenkins
Rex Granum
Deputy Press Secretaries 456-2100
456-2100

Vice President's Office:

Dick Moe
Vice President's Chief of Staff 456-6606

WASHINGTON

November 12, 1980

LIST OF TRANSITION OFFICERS
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE Jim Williams (Howard Hjort - budget) (Joan Wallace - space, tech., pers.)	447-6158
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Ms. Elsa Porter	377-4951
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Peter Hamilton	697-8388
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION Under Secretary Steven A. Minter	755-1100
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Douglas G. Robinson	252-6476
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Randy Kinder Alair Townsend	245-7163 245-6396
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT Terrence Duvernay	755-6810
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR William Kendig	343-4701
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Kevin D. Rooney	633-3101
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR Paul Jensen	523-8231
DEPARTMENT OF STATE Peter Tarnoff	632-2540
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Deputy Secretary Bill Beckham	426-2222
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY Curtis Hessler	566-2551

ACTION	
Robert Currie	254-7264
COMMUNITY SERVICES ADMINISTRATION	
Mr. Lee Foley	254-5590
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS	
Susan Irving	395-5084
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY	
Malcolm Baldwin	395-4522
COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY	
Bob Russell	456-6466
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY	
Jack Ford	755-2705
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY	
William S.W. Jones	653-7776
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION	
Mr. E. Perley Eaton, Jr.	566-1212
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL	
Les Denend	456-2235
(For National Security Affairs)	
Ms. Christine Dodson	395-3440
(For the NSC staff)	
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION	
Ms. Sarah T. Kadec	456-2804
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET	
Ms. Alice Rogoff	456-6992
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT	
Alan Campbell, Director	632-4724
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM	
Dr. Bernard Rotsker	724-0817
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION	
Bill Mauk	653-6678
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE PRESIDENT	
(AMBASSADOR SOL LINOWITZ)	
Andy Marks	456-7620
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE	
Ambassador Robert Hormats	395-5114
Robert Cassidy	395-3150
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION	
Rufus H. Wilson	389-2817

CIA

Richard Lehman



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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY

Richard Cohen

724-9185

OFFICE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY POLICY

Frank Press

456-7116

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Jerry Griffin

755-3972

PEACE CORPS

Dick Celeste

254-7970

OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS

Esther Peterson

456-6970

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

21 November 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefings of the President-Elect

1. On 19 and 20 November the DCI briefed the President-Elect at 716 Jackson Place. Present in addition to Governor Reagan were the Vice-President-Elect, Messrs. Meese, Allen, Casey and Baker, and Admiral Murphy. On 19 November the DCI was accompanied by [] and myself and on 20 November by [] Mr. Huffstutler, and myself.

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2. On 19 November we briefed on the Iran-Iraq war, the internal situation in Iran, more general Middle Eastern issues concerning Israel and Saudia Arabia and Afghanistan. The DCI opened that session with a short presentation on the organization and functioning of the Intelligence Community. On 20 November we briefed on Poland, Central America, and the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance. Because the session was terminated early, the Soviet strategic and economic briefings were not delivered; they are to be rescheduled in December. Copies of the substantive briefings actually used are attached.

3. Before the session with the President-Elect on 19 November, Messrs. [] of the Office of Security gave a security briefing to Meese, Allen, Casey and Baker.

4. The briefings in general went well. There were a number of questions, mostly from Ambassador Bush and Mr. Allen. Governor Reagan's questions went largely in the direction of "what can we do about it?"

[]
Richard Lehman
CIA Transition Officer

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Attachments

Addendum:

On 19 November, the DCI also briefed on []

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All portions of this memo are
classified SECRET

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SUBJECT: Briefings of the President-Elect

Distribution:

- #1 - Transition File
- #2 - C/NIC Chrono
- #3 - NFAC Registry

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THRUST OUTLINE - IRAN-IRAQ

The War

- I. The war has settled into one of attrition. Neither side has the military strength to bring about a decisive victory thus the outcome will be determined a political upheaval in one capital or the other. Tehran's most serious problem will be economic deprivation; Baghdad's will be to prepare its population psychologically for a long war.
- II. The open-ended nature of the war has made the risk of another sharp rise in world oil prices much greater and more immediate. Because an end of the conflict is not in sight and because of continuing damage to Iraqi oil facilities it is increasingly likely that no significant amount of Iraqi oil will be exported until months after an end of the conflict. Oil inventories in non-Communist countries should be adequate to meet overall demand through the winter, but a much larger than normal inventory draw-down will be necessary.
 - A. The world market may be on the verge of a new round of panic oil buying as a result of a growing reluctance by many major companies to drawdown their stocks.
 1. Current price pressures largely the result of the uneven impact of supply disruptions on consuming countries, especially those that have lost Iraqi and Iranian crude.
 2. Moreover, buyer fears that the OPEC nations will raise official prices even before their semiannual ministerial meeting in mid-December, are contributing to the pressure.

(price pressures
graphic)

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- (chart on shortfalls)
- B. Even if stocks among companies were drawn down evenly and smoothly, price pressures will be very high by late winter as current stock cushion near depletion.
- C. So far, increased production by other OPEC countries has offset only a small portion of the nearly 4-million-barrel-per-day loss in exports from Iran and Iraq. Total OPEC production now is only about 24 million barrels per day; about 26-27 million barrels per day is needed to support anticipated 1981 oil demand.
1. Recent Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti border installation - although thus far intended only as symbolic warnings - raise the distinct possibility that exports from elsewhere in the Gulf could also be disrupted.

III. The Current Military Situation

- (Map - Iranian territory held by Iraq)
- A. Iraq now occupies essentially no more than the Iranian territory seized by the second week of the war (early October) -- an irregular line running from the West of Dezful and Ahvaz through the key Khuzestan towns of Khorramshahr and Abadan and small enclaves in the north near Qasr-e-Shirin.
- (Map of Shatt al Arab)
- B. The Iraqis calculate that it cannot achieve its principal goal -- control of the Shatt al Arab -- until it seizes Abadan and Khorramshahr to bargain with. The latter is largely in Iraqi hands, but the fall of Abadan does not appear imminent.
- C. A military resolution of the situation is not likely in the near term.
1. Iraq does not have power to penetrate deeply into Iran with ground forces. Its tactics are, in any case, very conservative and based

on avoidance of casualties among its troops, who are predominantly Shia and have religious affinity with Iranians.

2. Iran probably cannot assemble the force necessary to launch a successful counterattack by the end of the year.

(Map of oil facilities - operating & not operating)

D. Each side, meanwhile, will continue to conduct air strikes at economic targets and try to maximize cost of continued conflict on its enemy.

1. There is no apparent negotiating bridge between Tehran and Baghdad.

2. Mediation efforts currently underway have had no success thus far.

IV. If a break in deadlock comes, it is likely to be as a result of political moves in either Baghdad or Tehran

A. Prolonged conflict means economic strain for both countries. Iraq has a more flexible transportation system and can import through Jordan, Kuwait and the UAE. But even limited hardships are an embarrassment to the regime given the unavailability of an early political payoff to "Saddam's war."

B. Iran will be subjected to deeper economic deprivation.

1. Has already lost 60 percent of refining capacity and will suffer fuel shortages this winter.
2. Current food shortages, due partly to import problems, will worsen this winter.
3. Fuel, power, and import shortages will further damage economy already devastated by revolution.

- C. The Iranian population probably is better prepared psychologically to endure hardships than is Iraq's. The issue is: Can Iranian government withstand tough winter better than Iraqi government can hold loyalty of its Shia majority and a public which sees no clear or immediate reason for the Iraqi-initiated war.
- V. Soviets see opportunity to exploit in Iran-Iraq conflict, although they have showed signs of being confused by events particularly in first weeks. But now clear that:
- A. Primary objective is to block US re-entry into Iran, expand their own influence in Tehran, and encourage end to war.
1. This requires a generally balanced policy toward the war and minimal arms resupply of Iraq -- do not want to force Iran into US arms.
 2. Ungenerous policy toward Iraq also intended push Saddam Hussein to negotiating table and to put the independent-minded Saddam on notice that Soviet cooperation carries a price tag, mainly greater Iraqi support for Soviet policies in the Middle East.
 3. Iran's unreceptive attitude toward Soviet offers of help has made Soviets concentrate primarily on playing up US as cause of war.
 4. Real dilemma for Soviets, however: rupture relations Iraq but no guarantee gains with Iran.
- B. US position complicated by hostage situation
1. Continuing threats to Gulf stability increase the interest of

Saudis and smaller states in closer security ties to US,
but wariness remains. Fear hostages-for-spare parts deal
with Iran; worry about US tilt toward non-Arab Iran.

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Iranian Domestic Political Dynamics and the Hostages

I. The domestic power struggle in Tehran is intensifying again after a temporary rallying together caused by war.

A. The domestic struggle is a result of the fundamentalist clerics

1. War with Iraq has strengthened Bani-Sadr's position because of his new alliance with military and he is seen as revitalized rival to clerics.

2. Led by Ayatollah Beheshti, the clerics have already seized control of most key power centers and they want no rivals, particularly with military backing.

(power centers
graphics)

3. Khomeini favors clerics but has prevented them from eliminating their secular rivals in order to maintain his own dominance.

4. Divisions within clerical camp complicate consolidation of authority. Some (Shariat-Madari) favor secularists, others are jealous of Beheshti and more extreme.

II. The war with Iraq highlighted Iran's international isolation; her need for access to military equipment, spare parts and medical supplies.

A. This helped develop the consensus in favor of ending the hostage crisis, but it has been fragile consensus and seems to be coming apart. There are a number of key examples of new turmoil:

1. The militants have still not turned the hostages over to the government, although given permission to do so by Khomeini, and we have no indications that serious planning is underway to do so.

SECRET

a. Most of the hostages are probably still in the Embassy.

We believe the rest are in Tehran probably at Lavizan

(graphic of Embassy
and Lavizan Prison)



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Embassy. We have numerous reports that some are in
Lavizan but we have no confirmed sightings of hostages there.)

2. The arrest and subsequent release of former FM Ghotbzadeh is
another example of fragmented authority

III. The power struggle has and will continue to determine the hostages fate.

A. Hostages taken in order to weaken Bazargan government and destroy
US influence in Iran.

B. Since Bani-Sadr's January election, clerics have repeatedly used
hostages against him.

C. Prolonged negotiations with the US on hostage release will give
cleric extremists greater opportunity to intimidate more cooperative
individuals with charges that they are not sufficiently revolutionary.

IV. Release of the hostages will not usher in a rapprochement with the US.

A. Anti-US feeling is deeply imbedded and still politically useful.

B. Moreover, an end to the hostage crisis will not stop the power
struggle in Tehran.

1. The struggle will increasingly center on a search for
scapegoats to explain Iran's setbacks in Khuzestan at the
hands of Iraq. Bani-Sadr very vulnerable on this.

SECRET

- C. The greatest immediate danger to the regime is a military coup.
1. Military has gained status and greater cohesion as result of war.
 2. Many senior officers either skeptical or oppose to revol. regime.
 3. But Khomeini still retains substantial lower-class support and relatively effective Revolutionary Guards. Together these forces could prevent challengers from gaining full control.
- V. In all of this, the left is waiting on the sidelines--hoping to pick up the pieces later.
- A. Pro-Soviet Tudeh is small in numbers but well organized.
1. Tudeh has recruited some military officers.
 2. Other leftist groups--Mujahedin and Fedayeen--are larger but less organized.
 3. Kurds and other minorities have leftist sympathies.
- B. Regime has been cracking down on left for months but remains concerned that left is long term threat.

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17 Nov 80

Afghanistan

Since last briefing little change.

Insurgents holding own;

Afghan gov't in disarray;

Sov preparing for long haul.

Probably can wear down in time.

Issue for you will be how much to make of the opportunity in meantime
to make Sov pay political cost for their annexation of Afghan.

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OSR-RMHuffstutler

No. 3

17 November 1980

- I. A year later, the overall situation has changed little
- Babrak government has no popular support
 - violent infighting continues between the two factions of the ruling Afghan Communist Party
 - the insurgency remains widespread
 - the Afghan Army remains weak and dispirited with only some 25,000 effectives of an army numbering about 120,000 in 1978.
 - Soviet troop levels remain about 85,000

Annotated
terrain
map

- II. To understand the nature of war, a terrain map explains a lot
- much of Afghanistan is inaccessible
 - roads around central massif connect population centers
 - Soviet and Afghan forces deployed at key points around the massif
(Troops down 100,000 to 60,000 -- Afghan 25 down from 120)
 - Sweeps to clear insurgents concentrate on a few areas
 - insurgents reoccupy with departure of troops
 - insufficient forces to occupy countryside

Photo of
Salang
Pass

SALANG
PICURES

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Photos
of
Equipment

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IV. Prospects are that Soviet forces will remain in Afghanistan indefinitely

- Soviets pressing Afghan Communist Party to build popular base but Party would fall if Soviets withdraw
- Afghan army will take at least several years to rebuild
- insurgency is still widespread but cannot defeat Soviets militarily
- Soviets building permanent military facilities for troops and logistics
- Soviet presence thus offers policy opportunities for US although increasingly difficult to sustain international reaction to the invasion

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DCI Notes
0900, 18 Nov 80

POLAND

It was severity of econ problems led Polish government to introduce austerity measures

These touched off strikes

Government kept lid on ever since only by concessions

1st effect - substitute higher consumer satisfaction for austerity as government goal

No econ solution without sizeable western econ credits & aid; & even with such help pol price may be more than Soviets can accept and they will take over

Hence US must decide how far want proceed on aid; and how we and allies will respond if Soviets do invade

Econ bottom line:

\$4.5B aid/yr to hold own on imports and not default on loans

\$5 - 8B/year in loans due for repayment will have to be rolled over -

(how much US?)

(how much West?)

Even with this much help from us, west Europe and Soviets unsure whether we'd be postponing econ collapse or buying time for Poland put econ on viable footing

Econ prospects not hopeless - though not optimistic Pol Government would put opportunity afforded by aid to right use or could persuade workers that reforms were permanent enough to take seriously -

- Lot of the Polish problem is near total alienation Pol populace from government

Pessimistic, though, also on political side

2nd effect of series of concessions government has been to:

Embolden workers -

New claims, e.g. censorship

Spread to new sectors

e.g. health workers and teachers

In effect rival pol structure is growing - clearly can't be tolerated by Poles let alone Soviets

Limits what Pol government can do -

Very risky use own force

Sign may have considered last week

Clearly neither they nor Soviets want Soviet force

Church particularly work to help government avoid this outcome

Soviets have to move if Pol government losing control or exceeding limits socialism

Polish virus already has E. Ger & Czechs frightened and reacting

Polish LOC vital

Should Soviets intervene

Would prefer full-scale invasion (32 divisions)

Seven CAT I from EE, rest from WMDs

Eight CAT II, 15 CAT III, two airborne

(CAT I)

Could take two weeks for mobilization and rehearsal

Ergo, about 6 to 12 days warning

Smaller scale (10 to 20 divisions)

Three days warning

No hard evidence

Issues for US

No invasion

Economic assistance?

Poles already requesting over \$3B from US

Will need about \$4B annually for next several years

Western cooperation

Response to use of force

Military

Western allies: Little, Luns' statement


Economic, little leverage (used up in reaction to Afghanistan)

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
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Sites of Strikes, Unrest Since 1 November



Increase in Polish Hard Currency Debt and Debt Service Ratio, 1975-1980



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Forces Likely to be Considered in Soviet Contingency Plans for Poland



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MAT

- International forces (Cuba, Panama, Venezuela, Libya, PLO) increasingly active.
- Immediate focus on Nicaragua, El Salvador.

II. In Nicaragua, Sandinista regime is in trouble.

- Authoritarianism (elections postponed until 1985), economic mismanagement, pervasive role of Cubans, alienation of church, has cut deeply into popular support of hardcore Marxist leadership.
- Confrontation between Sandinistas and democratic groups *is underway* approaching...

III. Most serious threat so far has been plot reaching into Army leadership.

- On Monday, Sandinistas arrested civilian leaders of plot, but not yet military as far as we know. [REDACTED]

but not yet military as far as we know.

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- Three possibilities: military leaders improvise desperation move very soon, go to ground, or try to negotiate with Sandinistas. Last one a bad bet unless they control bulk of

the Army, which we doubt. ~~More work will give Sat~~

- If they do move, we probably will not get warning with our

link to the plot broken.

Death of Salazar goes ^{with} ^{and} toward Confession, but not to

IV. If the plotters get something going but ~~were~~^{are} not immediately successful,

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the Sandinistas probably would invoke a secret mutual defense pact with Cuba.

- Castro would send troops unless support for the plotters very strong or he thought US ready to intervene.
- Without US intervention, Cuba can airlift 800 to 1,000 paratroopers within 24 hours, several thousand more as soon as an air field is secured (Managua, Puerto Cabezas^G). *A*
- Already about 3,500 Cuban advisers in Nicaragua of which 350 to 750 are military.

V. Our judgment is that Sandinistas (and Cubans) will probably be able to consolidate power despite their present troubles. *Probably within the plan*

El Salvador

VI. El Salvador as the next most vulnerable Central American state was clearly next on the Cuban list.

- The US has been making a major effort to build a moderate reformist government.
- The government is beset on the left by an insurgency supported by Cuba, Nicaragua, Libya and the PLO, and on the right by right-wing terrorism.

VII. The government started out very weak, but has improved its position since the summer. We give it a 50-50 chance.

- On the one hand reforms (land ownership, banking, export marketing) are beginning to undercut support for the insurgency for the peasants, and on the other it faces staggering economic problems (no money to buy seed), and indiscriminate

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killings of peasants by extreme rightist "death squads" tend to strengthen leftist support. Level of violence extremely high (see graphic). *Two a week*


- The governing junta (two military, three civilian members) has held together but could be split by distrust. The most immediate danger is a coup from the right.
- Army somewhat more ^{agreed} effective leftist insurgency, but guerilla strength holds at 3,000 to 4,000.

VIII. The situation could come apart if rightist coup wrecked current government programs or insurgents received increased supply of arms (Cubans, Libyans, PLO are preparing to do this). *More in Nicaragua could mean big problems*

IX. A leftist victory would deal serious blow to US prestige, which is committed to present government.


- Could anticipate greatly increased pressure against Guatemala and perhaps Honduras.

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
El Salvador: Estimated Deaths Due to Political Violence

Total number of deaths due to political violence including killings by leftists, rightists, security forces



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Central America/Caribbean Area



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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC-7537-80
17 November 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: PB/NSC Coordinator

FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America

SUBJECT : Briefing of Transition Team - Cuba

While not now on the agenda, the DCI may want to have this in reserve in case Transition Team raises it.

I. Domestic Problems

Escalating domestic problems contributed to Castro's frustrations and to his blunders in precipitating the initially embarrassing refugee crisis last April and May.

Economic stagnation (despite Soviet aid of about \$3 billion in 1979) has produced broadscale popular alienation, especially among young adults. Symptoms: declining worker productivity, increased corruption and crime, low-level dissidence.

At least one million Cubans (10% of population) would leave for the US if they could.

Castro angered and dismayed at tarnishing of revolutionary image has launched two-sided attack: security crackdown and opening of door temporarily for emigration; some new economic incentives (small-scale private markets, pay differentials, greater plant-manager authority) to increase productivity and morale.

No immediate or identifiable medium-term threat to his regime, but little chance that he can make the system work much better.

II. Foreign Policy Problem

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which Cuba was forced to support, weakened Castro's ability to dominate the Non-aligned Movement, and undercut his pretensions to play world-class diplomatic role generally.

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DRV FM MULTIPLE
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III. Cuba and the US

As US-Soviet relations worsened last year and as Washington took some anti-Cuban measures in response to the Soviet Brigade issue, Castro perceived an increased threat of direct US action against Cuba.

In response, Castro has repeatedly indicated in recent months that he desires talks with the US on the full range of bilateral issues. Castro probably expects no major concessions from the US--and is prepared to give none from the Cuban side.

But he apparently believes that even if indecisive negotiations were launched, the US would be more constrained from seeking a confrontation with Cuba over its support for revolution in Central America. Moreover, he might expect some loosening of the economic embargo, which would also be seen as increasing the legitimacy and security of his regime.

Castro may use the threat of resumption of the refugee flow to try to get the US to the negotiating table.

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC-7530-80
17 November 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: PB/NSC Coordinator

FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America

SUBJECT : Situation in the Caribbean. Talking Points for
DCI Briefing of Transition Team

I. General

1. Coup by pro-Cuban group in Grenada, March 1979, underscored weak footings of dominant moderate political groups in Caribbean, threats to US interests, and opportunities for Cuba to expand influence.

2. Great diversity of circumstances. A few have relatively sound economies and reasonable strong democratic institutions (Dominican Republic, Bahamas, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago). Some have potential but in serious difficulties because of mismanagement or violence (Jamaica, Suriname). Others seem to be permanent paupers (Haiti, English-speaking ministates).

3. Recent ouster of pro-Cuban Manley government by Seaga in Jamaica, and other electoral victories by moderates in English-speaking islands illustrates that moderates have the ability to assert/retain influence in short-term.

4. But long-term trends still negative: gross economic problems (worsened by oil crisis and economic strains in industrial democracies) threatening the ability of governments to meet the needs of youthful populations and to stem the exodus of skilled workers and the business classes.

5. Domestic and foreign policy setbacks have tarnished Cuba's image, but Castro still holds great appeal to new generation of radical leaders, who would seek close ties with Havana if they were to gain office through elections or coups.

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6. Increased security assistance from US and other donors will be of some use, but only large-scale economic assistance (on highly concessional terms for the poorer countries), and concerted, but low-key political aid can underwrite region's stability and security over long haul.

II. Jamaica

Likely to be key test for Western aid programs. Massive Seaga victory a major setback for Castro and regional radicals. Seaga should prove an intelligent and vigorous administrator. But he inherits a violence-wracked and economically enfeebled country; and no set of domestic policies can provide for political stability and economic recovery--without quick and steady foreign aid.

III. Grenada

The dictatorial and pro-Castro policies of the Bishop government have alienated Grenada's regional neighbors. Economic management has been pragmatic and efficient, however. Domestic opposition limited; and Bishop, with Cuban aid, probably can hang on despite regional isolation.

IV. Eastern Caribbean Ministates

Moderate governments wary of Cuba, but do not wish to be drawn into regional power struggle as price for US assistance. Want security and especially economic aid from US, but on highly concessional terms and without US bear hug. In security area, would prefer that UK continue active roll; and British seem willing, despite cutbacks in foreign aid elsewhere.

V. Guyana

Burnham government turning more openly dictatorial, but in foreign policy has reduced Cuban influence and is seeking to improve his US ties.

VI. Suriname

Inexperienced moderates have temporarily asserted themselves and reduced influence that radicals had after February 1980 coup. Dutch maintain generous aid program, but continued political flux and uncertainty require greater US attention to this mineral-rich country.

VII. Dominican Republic

Although high oil prices are bleeding the economy, country--compared with most of its regional neighbors--remains relatively prosperous, and likely to continue moderate policies over short term.

VIII. Haiti

A political and economic basket case. Outflow of refugees causing problems in region as well as US. Duvalier likely to retain power and cooperate with US.

IX. Conclusion

Short-term remission of radical/pro-Cuban tendencies almost across-the-board. But US must take advantage of this window, or face medium-term (3-5 years) proliferation of problems in zero-sum game with Castro.




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17 November 1980

Situation in Africa

The following talking points discuss those African countries that appear to be of importance to US policy at this time.

I. Somalia-Ethiopia

- A. Soviet-supported Ethiopian forces have regained initiative against Somali and Somali-backed forces in Ogaden war.
 - Further decline in Somalia's position could lead its armed forces to replace President Siad with some other military officer, although we have seen no sign of imminent move.
 - Refugee population of over 1.5 million resulting from war is strain Somalia's already fragile food and fuel supplies.
 - Siad believes military access agreement will result in US military and economic assistance he needs to stay in power.
- B. Ethiopia's Mengistu also faces serious internal problems--Eritrean insurgency and an economy weakened by socialist policies.
 - Addis Ababa increasingly unhappy over levels of Soviet assistance.
 - Cubans have around 13,000 military personnel in Ethiopia.

II. Nigeria

- A. Shagari's year-old civilian government performing reasonably well, but rising expectations and endemic regional and ethnic rivalries pose tough challenges.
- B. Shagari has indicated "wait and see" attitude toward new US administration and a desire to cooperate with Washington on African and Third World problems.
 - Bilateral relations likely to suffer if Lagos perceives US African policy as more concerned with USSR than with black majority rule.
 - Shagari wants to accelerate US participation in Nigerian economic development and is concerned that promised increases in US technical aid may not materialize.
- C. Nigeria remains second only to Saudi Arabia as supplier of crude oil to US, and second to South Africa as recipient of US investment south of Sahara.
 - \$12 billion trade surplus with US this year is largest of any US trading partner.

III. South Africa

- A. Pretoria's racial policies continue to complicate US dealings throughout Africa and remain major source of intra-regional tension.
 - Botha government pushing program of limited reform including gradual easing of economic and social apartheid, greater autonomy for nonwhite townships, and some help for impoverished homelands.
 - Whites unwilling, however, to meet nonwhite demands for meaningful power-sharing.
 - Outlook is for continuing nonwhite unrest, including sporadic violence.
- B. Still no sign South Africa will quit stalling on implementation of UN plan for Namibia's independence, which Pretoria accepted in principle in 1978.
 - Frontline states and SWAPO have accepted most South African position on details of implementation.
 - Next round of negotiations may be meeting of all parties at a neutral site in December, but Pretoria may simply see such a conference as further opportunity for footdragging.
 - Pretoria keeping open option of unilaterally granting Namibia independence under South African-backed local government.

IV. Liberia

- A. Enlisted men's coup last April has called into question Liberia's traditional "special relationship" with US but has not necessarily ended it.
 - Monrovia has sought to adopt a more nonaligned, Africa-centered foreign policy to reduce US "surrogate" image.
 - US military access rights and communications facilities not yet threatened.
- B. Regime is unstable, faces severe fiscal crunch, and looks to US for substantial military and economic aid.
 - Perception of US disinterest would probably lead regime to expand ties with Soviets as well as radical Africans and Arabs.

V. Zimbabwe

- A. Despite sporadic violence, Mugabe's first six months relatively smooth.
 - Recent major ZANU-ZAPU clash at Bulawayo reflects tensions between two ex-guerrilla groups and difficulty of integrating them into national Army.

--Mugabe's other main problem is maintaining confidence of economical vital white community while also satisfying black demands for economic and social change.

B. Mugabe feels West not forthcoming enough with aid to ease transition.

VI. Zaire

A. Economy has been deteriorating in recent years, and Mobutu's popularity is at all-time low.

--Upheaval could occur with little advance warning, but many Zairians believe US would intervene to keep staunchly anti-Communist Mobutu in power.

--Mobutu looks to his major supporters--Belgium, France, and US--to bail him out of periodic economic crises and to protect regime from insurgents based in neighboring countries.

B. Zaire provides about 70 percent of US cobalt and is also a major copper producer.

VII. Angola

A. Despite Angolan government's Marxist orientation and heavy Cuban (15,000 to 19,000 military personnel) and Soviet presence, it would like to improve ties with West and establish diplomatic relations with US.

--Some members of faction-ridden regime, however, are suspicious of US intentions and believe new US administration will resume assistance to UNITA insurgents.

B. US firms continue to play central role in Angola's oil industry.

VIII. Chad

A. African countries increasingly concerned over Libya's escalating military involvement in Chadian civil war and over threat of further Libyan adventurism south of Sahara.

--Egypt and Sudan clandestinely supporting anti-Libyan forces.

IX. Uganda

A. Although elections scheduled for next month, country will remain unstable.

--Situation is adding to tensions between Tanzania, which has 11,000 troops in Uganda, and Kenya and Sudan, which are suspicious of Tanzanians.

X. Zambia

A. Potential for instability is growing, largely as result of Kaunda regime's mismanagement of economy.

OUTLINE FOR DCI BRIEFING

10 November

POLAND

- I. Historically, Poland least stable, most volatile of East European states
 - A. Political upheavals in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976
- II. This year's crisis bubbling since July
 - A. Government increased prices for meat
 - B. Series of uncoordinated strikes across country beginning 2 July
 - 1. Workers at first demanded wage increases, and government granted them
 - 2. Strikers made political demands, including call for reform of trade unions
 - 3. Regime actions generally weak; no perceptible policy--regime reacted rather than took initiative
- III. New stage of crisis in mid-August when shipyard workers and others along Baltic Coast went on strike and make many political demands
 - A. Major demand: free and independent trade unions
 - B. Gierek made personnel changes (scapegoats) and promised economic concessions--to no avail
 - C. Regime eventually gave in and signed accords that recognized right to strike and free, independent unions

D. Gieriek and others lost positions on 5 September;
Kania new party leader

IV. Since early September, regime and unions have been in
political battle, and unions have won most skirmishes

A. While regime still reeling in early September,
strike leaders and political dissidents went
across country organizing new unions

B. Union leaders decided to establish nationwide
"advisory" organization--Solidarity

C. Solidarity, led by charismatic Lech Walesa,
receiving political and legal advice from
political dissidents, Catholic intellectuals,
and reportedly from Catholic Church hierarchy

D. Union apparently split into moderate and hardline
factions, but leaders join in common front when
facing regime

E. Strikes--and threats to strike--most important
weapon

1. Demonstrated power on 3 October in extremely
well-organized nationwide symbolic strike

F. Won legal, political battle about Solidarity's
charter on 10 November

1. Supreme Court overruled lower court and
decided charter itself did not have to
contain reference to party playing leading
role

2. Regime in effect caved in--accepted idea first presented by Solidarity that reference to party be contained in protocol
3. Government prosecutor argued that lower lower court had erred

V. Kania regime obviously thought time not propitious for confrontation

A. Major problems--party not united

1. Middle and lower ranks of party in particular demoralized and ineffective
2. Kania and others openly acknowledged that more personnel changes in the offing, thus adding to sense of discontent
3. Reports that many party members have turned in cards [REDACTED] 25X1
4. Kania acknowledged that party members participated in strikes and have joined in Solidarity
5. Leadership probably not united:
 - a. Number of reports that Kania will serve as interim leader, to be replaced within months [REDACTED] 25X1
 - b. Stefan Olszowski most often mentioned as replacement [REDACTED] 25X1
6. Extraordinary party congress to be held, but when is unclear
7. Problems in party to be unresolved for some time to come

- B. Party realizes it needs cooperation from unions
 - 1. Could arrest union leaders and crack down on workers, but cannot force people to work
 - 2. Major theme of regime is need for greater productivity
 - a. Wants unions to persuade workers to work harder
- C. Regime propably hopes it can split union leadership and workers from union leaders
 - 1. Aware of splits within union leadership
 - 2. May believe it can coopt moderates
 - 3. By presenting image of being reasonable and seeking partnership with Solidarity, regime hopes workers will blame union leaders as economic problems continue and increase
- D. Party knows use of force still risky
 - 1. Probably not certain that regular police could successfully take on workers
 - 2. Unsure whether regular Armed forces would engage workers
 - a. Military leaders presumably have plans for engaging workers
 - b. But Defense Minister Jaruzelski has publicly said that military wants political solutions to problems
 - c. And regime probably unsure whether lower-ranking troops would obey orders

- d. In addition, regime probably fears that use of force would lead to nationwide strikes and/or violence

VI. Role of Catholic Church

- A. Church recognized as only legitimate representative of Polish nation and thus has major influence, power
- B. Cardinal Wyszynski and other leaders of episcopate support workers
 1. Primate and other leaders have had symbolically important meetings with Walesa and other union leaders
- C. But Church also urging unions to be moderate
- D. Wyszynski believes intransigents in party could gain upper hand and force showdown with workers [REDACTED]
- E. Wants to avoid violence at all costs, lest this lead to a Soviet intervention
- F. Will indirectly aid party by continuing to advise unions to be cautious and non-confrontational

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VII. East European Reaction

- A. No "spillover" yet observed, but regimes very concerned and nervous
- B. East Germans and Czechoslovaks most apprehensive and most negative toward Polish leadership
 1. East German leader and several Czechoslovak leaders (Bilak, Hoffmann, Husak to lesser extent) have warned Poles that Warsaw Pact

cannot accept loosening of party control and
"antisocialism" in Poland

2. East Germans have restricted travel by their
citizens and Poles
3. Prague reportedly contemplating similar
measure

C. Romania's Ceausescu also nervous

1. Has spoken critically on Polish leadership
2. Does not want, will not support, Pact
intervention
 - a. Fears example of invasion
 - b. Knows ability to conduct foreign
policy independent of Soviets would
be severely constrained

D. Other East Europeans relatively low-key in
commentary

VIII. Soviet Reactions

- A. The Soviets are deeply concerned by the Polish
party's inability to reestablish its political
authority in Poland but have little effective
leverage on the situation short of military
intervention
1. Moscow fears that trends have been set in
motion that could lead to the collapse of
party control, the erosion of Polish
loyalty and the abandonment of military
cooperation with Moscow

be able to resolve the crisis

4. Nevertheless, Moscow cannot be happy with Kania's inability to check the momentum behind the new unions

a. The Soviets may not be fully confident of Kania's personal ability to establish leadership over the situation

C. The Soviets are bitterly opposed to the precedent of the new unions but seem to recognize that they have vast popular support

1. Initially, reporting indicated Moscow hoped to revitalize the existing government unions and erode the concessions granted the autonomous unions

2. The Soviets, however, seem to be reluctantly accepting reality and conceding the unions continued existence

a. Some Soviets have even suggested the unions could be a positive development if they helped resolve Poland's deep economic problems

3. Moscow is insistent, however, that the unions not become a political organization that could determine the policies of the party or become an alternative to Communist party control

D. The Soviets have already tried a variety of pressure tactics but to little avail

1. In September they issued a string of authoritative articles critical of Western exploitation of the Polish situation
2. Since then they have evidently encouraged the Czechs and East Germans to take the lead in criticizing anti-socialist elements and trends in Poland
3. The 30 October Kania visit to Moscow and the 8 November announcement of joint Polish-Soviet military "maneuvers" were designed to intimidate the independent unions
4. The Soviets have given the government some economic aid--but seem unwilling to underwrite all Poland's economic needs
5. Moscow has some additional political and military cards it can play short of intervention
 - a. Joint Soviet-Polish politburo meetings
 - b. Warsaw Pact meetings and declarations of concern
 - c. Public invocation of the Brezhnev doctrine

- d. Sizable military maneuvers in
the USSR or in Poland
- E. Moscow's ultimate weapon is military intervention
 - 1. The Soviets do not want to resort to this
unless absolutely necessary in view of the
costs
 - a. The Poles would fight
 - b. A 30 division intervention force
detracting from Moscow's other
military needs
 - c. It would mean a sizable long term
occupation of Poland
 - d. Efforts to maintain stable relations
with the West Europeans would receive
a serious setback
 - 2. The Soviets would certainly shoulder these
costs if necessary
 - a. Soviet domination of Poland is vital
to Moscow's security
 - b. A less reliable Poland would expose
East Germany to Western penetration
and influence
 - c. Unrest would spread to other East
European nations

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IX. Outlook

A. Supreme Court's decision on ~~Monday~~ ended latest tactical battle, but major problems persist

1. Regime and unions must still agree on how well regime implementing other provisions of August agreements
 - a. Law being drafted guaranteeing right to strike
 - b. Rules on censorship to be changes
 - c. Several "pocketbook" issues not yet resolved
2. Union leaders to meet in mid-December to review regime's performance
3. Any single issue could lead to renewed confrontation, as could feeling on part of regime or workers that cumulative effect of seemingly minor things was too much to bear
4. Polish economy in a shambles
 - a. Major shortages of coal and electricity have prompted regime already to issue warnings about "brown-outs" and "black-outs" this winter
 - b. Major shortfall in potato crop

c. Distressed slaughtering of hogs,
other animals will mean meat
available for some months but
shortages next spring

d. Poles need credits from West and
having difficulty obtaining them

C. In general, crisis will continue for many months,
with periods of relative calm and periods of
intense activity and possible confrontation

1. Predicting exact issue that would lead to
breakdown of existing, tenuous modus
vivendi or time when this might occur
is very difficult

2. Privately, Soviet officials have acknowledged that the ferment in Poland is reminiscent of that in Czechoslovakia in 1968
 3. The Soviets see the situation as a fertile area for Western exploitation
 4. Moscow is worried about the impact Polish developments may have in other Eastern European states and in the USSR itself
- B. Moscow has given a measure of support to the Kania government and apparently currently sees it as its best hope for rectifying the situation
1. Although Moscow ~~is~~ not handpick Kania, it reportedly encouraged the ouster of Gierek and indicated that Kania was an acceptable replacement
 2. The Soviets are apparently satisfied that Kania's conservative background and orientation means he is opposed to radical liberalization in Poland
 3. Moscow is giving Kania time to try and work out a satisfactory relationship with the unions that will still leave party dominance intact
 - a. During Kania's lightening visit to Moscow on 30 October, Brezhnev expressed confidence that Polish Communists would

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18 November 1980, 1530

SOVIET STRATEGIC PROGRAMS

I. The Current Situation

A. Soviets are basically pleased with recognition of their achievement of parity or perhaps even superiority with the US in strategic weaponry.

1. With a large defense establishment, a massive, well disciplined R&D organization, a willingness to give defense programs a high priority in allocation of resources, the Soviets have been able to at least match and in some areas surpass the US in many of the commonly used measures of strategic force comparisons.

2. Looking at the usual static indicators, the one US advantage is in numbers of warheads. Soviets lead in number of delivery vehicles, and equivalent megatonage, and have surpassed US accuracy capability in the latest version of their SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs, although only a small number have yet been deployed.

3. Combining these static measures we can derive two measures of the utility of US and Soviet forces.

Chart 1

a. First we estimate lethal area potential (LAP), which is the area of typical urban buildup each force could destroy. This is shown in Chart 1.

Chart 3

b. Next we estimate the hard target potential (HTP), number of hardened targets, like silos each force could destroy (see Chart 3).

Chart 4

4. This raises the issue which dominates perceptions in this country the vulnerability of US ICBMs to a first strike by the Soviets. At present,

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
Chart 5



5. ICBMs are not the full force of either side, however. We next can measure what the US surviving capability would be if the Soviets attacked us; and compare it with what the Soviets would have remaining after such an attack, assuming SALT II limits.

Chart 6

Chart 7



7. Besides those quantitative measures, however, we must consider the tremendous momentum of Soviet programs, not merely in offensive systems, but for defensive systems and command and control as well. The Soviets will have a number of options for making further progress in the next decade.

a. Five to seven ICBM programs (some may be mobile), a new class, large SSBN (displacement one and one-half times the Trident class), and possibly air-launched and submarine-launched cruise missiles.

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b. In the defensive area they are continuing an active ABM R&D program, resilient C², trying to add an effective low-altitude capability to their already massive air defense system, working on the very difficult ASW problem, and spending the equivalent of over two billion dollars per year on civil defense. They are also striving to achieve technological breakthrough in laser and directed energy weapons in the fields of air defense, anti-satellite systems, and missile defense.

II. Prospects for the late 1980s

A. Despite the favorable trends for the Soviets in the early 1980s, the Soviets could be apprehensive about how long their hard won gains would last.

1. Soviets believe they face aroused US public opinion which is willing to spend more on defense, they fear US technology and industry.

2. They are also concerned about the nuclear threat from China, UK, and France. They are particularly concerned about the NATO decision to deploy long range theater nuclear forces, which would be capable of striking Soviet territory. For example, the Pershing II missiles, scheduled to be deployed by NATO in the early 1980s could attack Soviet ICBMs in western USSR.

3. The Soviet economic prospects for the 1980s look increasingly glum as they face decreasing productivity, which will cause further stringencies in funding defense programs.

4. Even before the election they were concerned with US strategic programs.

a. Cruise missile and Trident programs will further compound problems of defense.

b. They are particularly concerned about the MX.

5. The effect of these programs was dramatically displayed on the previous two charts. If the Soviets perceive this threat to their residual potentials they have a number of options for which their vigorous R&D program leaves them well prepared.

Chart 8

a. They can increase the number of ICRM warheads to the maximum within SALT limits. The impact would be as shown in Chart 8. A US expansion to 7,200 MX shelters would counter this.

Chart 9

b. Without SALT they could further increase the number of ICRM warheads, as shown on Chart 9. A US shelter program of 10,700 would counter Soviet efforts.

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6. In short, as the Soviets see MX as acting as a sponge to soak up thousands of their warheads they could counter by building more (their throw-weight helps here). We could counter-counter. If the race is unconstrained by SALT limits and starts soon, it would be difficult for the US to "win." If SALT limits prevail, an expansion of about 50 percent in MX shelters would "win." In between the result is mixed.

Chart 10

7. The deployment of MX also threatens to affect the survivability of the Soviet ICBMs by the late 1980s, as shown on Chart 10. To improve their force survivability they could, under SALT, deploy larger numbers of SLBMs or deploy mobile ICBMs, or both, but only at the expense of reducing fixed ICBMs. They could also deploy long-range cruise missiles. Without SALT, they would be free to build mobile systems of any type. They could also try defending their ICBMs by a widespread ABM system. If they chose, they could, with or without SALT, launch their ICBMs on tactical warning. In recent years their practice exercises have almost always featured launch-on-tactical-warning.

B. By the end of decade, the survivability of fixed ICBMs will become a problem for both sides, because further improvements in ICBM accuracies will make even the hardest silos vulnerable. This will increasingly create pressure to go towards mobile systems. The Soviets have developed one mobile ICBM (the SS-16, not deployed), and are working on at least one other. A trend towards mobile systems, particularly cruise missiles and ICBMs, will make verification of future SALT agreements even more difficult.

C. In light of stark contrast in projected Soviet strategic position in the first half of the 1980s and the threat to it in the last half, we must ask whether the Soviets will attempt to take advantage of what some have referred to as the "window of opportunity" of the early to mid-1980s.

1. Because Soviets have regularly exploited opportunities in the Third World and have taken necessary measures to secure Eastern Europe even before they achieved parity, we cannot confidently assess extent to which their new strategic power position has or will embolden them.

2. Now, as a generation ago, Soviets move to exploit opportunities, especially when they believe the risk of US counteraction to be low.

3. Thus, even in the early to mid-1980s, we expect the Soviets to probe and challenge the US in various situations to determine at what point the US is likely to react strongly. We do not, however, believe they will "go for broke" in the next few years.

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NIO/GPF
17 November 1980
1200

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TALKING POINTS

NATO-Warsaw Pact Balance

1. INTRODUCTION

Briefing will provide comparison of NATO-Warsaw Pact forces in Europe emphasizing:

- Soviet perception of balance [REDACTED] 25X1
- [REDACTED] 25X1
- Modernization trends;
- Nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities.

Traditionally, NATO has counted on quality to counter Warsaw Pact quantity advantage.

- Quality gap narrowing; Soviet modernization impressive;
- Quantity margin adequate to give Soviets confidence that NATO allies will not try to match the Pact;
- Margin not wide enough to make war attractive.

2. SOVIET POSTURE OPPOSITE NATO

Soviet ground, naval, and air forces designed to protect longest land border of any nation.

- Emphasis on Europe; 55% of ground forces opposite NATO, but cannot forget China or Southern region (Afghanistan, Iran);
- Ground forces designed for fast, deep armor-heavy offensive; nuclear or non-nuclear;
- Air forces organized for air defense of homeland and

Chart 1
Map of USSR

TOP SECRET,

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- Navy centered around ballistic missile submarines, combat on the periphery of land theaters and interruption of NATO SLOC.

Consider Central Europe as decisive area.

- Have capacity to conduct combined ground-air offensive campaign;
- Key issue is readiness and warning time.
 - Soviet forces not fully ready for war on daily basis;
 - Forces in forward area--highest state of readiness; others low readiness;
 - 30% of divisions opposite NATO are Category III (10-30% personnel manning, lack support equipment; 72 hours to mobilize; need training);
 - Naval forces: half available in five days; three-fourths available in 25 days.
- Expect a period of tension before war; time to mobilize, prepare nation;
- US can detect mobilization within a day or two;
- Soviets would prefer to mobilize and attack with clear preponderance of force (five fronts); could attack with less (two or three fronts).

3. COMPARISONS OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES

In terms of sheer numbers, the Soviet advantages are clear:

- Superiority in tanks--1.9:1 at M-Day; 2.5:1 after mobilization;

Chart 2
Map of Center
Region

Chart 3
c Comparisons

- Slight advantage in manpower;
- Significant advantage in divisions (2 to 1 after mobilization);
- NATO advantage in aircraft; 20% after mobilization.

Chart 4
Soviet perception
of buildup

Soviet perception of balance based on more than mere numbers; planning is based on correlation of forces; includes both quantitative and qualitative factors; takes into account modernization, training, quality of national forces (excellent evidence: detailed in writing, practiced in exercises).

Soviet perception of correlation of forces (force balance) is more conservative than numbers indicate:

- Rate ground forces as roughly equal at M-Day; gain 1.8:1 advantage after mobilization;
- Rate NATO combat aircraft superior both before and after mobilization--clear NATO advantage exceeding actual inventory comparison.

Transition: following charts show Soviets view of modernization, conservative.

Chart 5
Tank moderniza-
tion

Soviet view of tank quality: chart shows their perception of tank production and quality.

- New model every 5-8 years; large annual production (2,000);
- Rated NATO and WP tanks equal in '60s;
- Rated WP superior in '70s;
- Expect to match NATO tanks in '80s.

Bottom line--can match NATO quality, exceed NATO quantity.

Ch 5
Aircraft

Story is different in aircraft; chart 6 shows total inventory Modernization with Soviet perception of quality; WP expects NATO advantage to continue into '80s.

Chart 7
TNF

Rates NATO superior in avionics, pilot training, munitions.

Soviets have this view of the theater nuclear force balance:

- NATO leads in SR (artillery, rockets);
- WP leads in MR;
- WP and NATO both emphasizing improvements in LR

(Toronado, F-16, Fencer, P-II, SS-20, cruise missile).

4. CONCLUSIONS

Chart 8

Probable Soviet view of comparative strengths.

Chart represents best estimate about how Soviets assess basic conventional/tac nuc military balance.

Soviets are confident that they have the edge in the areas shows, but they know that they face:

- Superior NATO airpower and seapower;
- Flexible command and control system;
- Superior industrial and manpower reserves;
- Forces with the advantage of the defender;
- A cohesive alliance.

What does this mean?

- Soviets strongest suit: confidence in their armed forces;
- Respectful of US technology base;
- Conservative in thinking (tend to overrate West) about size of force structure;

- Concern about multiple enemies and uncertain allies.

On balance: can be confident in dealing with NATO alliance
from a position of military strength.

MAP OF USSR

(Will show Major Threaters: NATO,
FAR EAST, and ELSEWHERE, and
the number of Divisions
opposite each theater)

OPPOSITE
NATO
SOVIET

88

+

NON SOVIET

53

40
OTHER

47

OPPOSITE
CHINA


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Illustrative Warsaw Pact Ground Force Campaign in the Western TVD


Figure IV-1



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
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
LEGEND: M-DAY

Force Effectiveness Buildup in Central Europe (Soviet Effectiveness Perceptions)

Ground Force Divisions/Brigades




Tactical Air Forces



85


Tank Modernization: Soviet View Annual Buy-Main Battle Tanks



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SR - SHORT RANGE
MR - MEDIUM RANGE BETWEEN 100-1000 Km

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8

Probable Soviet View of Comparative Strengths

Warsaw Pact

Chemical/Biologic Readiness

Landforce Mobility, Firepower

C³ Centralized, Hardened

Initiative

**Long Range Theater
Nuclear Forces**

NATO

Airpower

C³ More Flexible

Advantage of Defender

Seapower

**Greater Reserves of Industry,
Manpower**

Reliable Allies

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